Banks are institutions wherein miracles happen regularly. We rarely
entrust our money to anyone but ourselves - and our banks. Despite a
very chequered history of mismanagement, corruption, false promises and
representations, delusions and behavioural inconsistency - banks still
succeed to motivate us to give them our money. Partly it is the feeling
that there is safety in numbers. The fashionable term today is "moral
hazard". The implicit guarantees of the state and of other financial
institutions moves us to take risks which we would, otherwise, have
avoided. Partly it is the sophistication of the banks in marketing and
promoting themselves and their products. Glossy brochures, professional
computer and video presentations and vast, shrine-like, real estate
complexes all serve to enhance the image of the banks as the temples of
the new religion of money.
But
what is behind all this? How can we judge the soundness of our banks?
In other words, how can we tell if our money is safely tucked away in a
safe haven?
The reflex is to go to the bank's balance sheets.
Banks and balance sheets have been both invented in their modern form in
the 15th century. A balance sheet, coupled with other financial
statements is supposed to provide us with a true and full picture of the
health of the bank, its past and its long-term prospects. The
surprising thing is that - despite common opinion - it does. The less
surprising element is that it is rather useless unless you know how to
read it.
Financial Statements (Income - aka Profit and Loss -
Statement, Cash Flow Statement and Balance Sheet) come in many forms.
Sometimes they conform to Western accounting standards (the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP, or the less rigorous and more
fuzzily worded International Accounting Standards, IAS). Otherwise, they
conform to local accounting standards, which often leave a lot to be
desired. Still, you should look for banks, which make their updated
financial reports available to you. The best choice would be a bank that
is audited by one of the Big Six Western accounting firms and makes its
audit reports publicly available. Such audited financial statements
should consolidate the financial results of the bank with the financial
results of its subsidiaries or associated companies. A lot often hides
in those corners of corporate ownership.
Banks are rated by
independent agencies. The most famous and most reliable of the lot is
Fitch-IBCA. Another one is Thomson BankWatch-BREE. These agencies assign
letter and number combinations to the banks, that reflect their
stability. Most agencies differentiate the short term from the long term
prospects of the banking institution rated. Some of them even study
(and rate) issues, such as the legality of the operations of the bank
(legal rating). Ostensibly, all a concerned person has to do, therefore,
is to step up to the bank manager, muster courage and ask for the
bank's rating. Unfortunately, life is more complicated than rating
agencies would like us to believe. They base themselves mostly on the
financial results of the bank rated, as a reliable gauge of its
financial strength or financial profile. Nothing is further from the
truth.
Admittedly, the financial results do contain a few
important facts. But one has to look beyond the naked figures to get the
real - often much less encouraging - picture.
Consider the thorny
issue of exchange rates. Financial statements are calculated (sometimes
stated in USD in addition to the local currency) using the exchange
rate prevailing on the 31st of December of the fiscal year (to which the
statements refer). In a country with a volatile domestic currency this
would tend to completely distort the true picture. This is especially
true if a big chunk of the activity preceded this arbitrary date. The
same applies to financial statements, which were not inflation-adjusted
in high inflation countries. The statements will look inflated and even
reflect profits where heavy losses were incurred. "Average amounts"
accounting (which makes use of average exchange rates throughout the
year) is even more misleading. The only way to truly reflect reality is
if the bank were to keep two sets of accounts: one in the local currency
and one in USD (or in some other currency of reference). Otherwise,
fictitious growth in the asset base (due to inflation or currency
fluctuations) could result.
Another example: in many countries,
changes in regulations can greatly effect the financial statements of a
bank. In 1996, in Russia, to take an example, the Bank of Russia changed
the algorithm for calculating an important banking ratio (the capital
to risk weighted assets ratio). Unless a Russian bank restated its
previous financial statements accordingly, a sharp change in
profitability appeared from nowhere.
The net assets themselves are
always misstated: the figure refers to the situation on 31/12. A
48-hour loan given to a collaborating firm can inflate the asset base on
the crucial date. This misrepresentation is only mildly ameliorated by
the introduction of an "average assets" calculus. Moreover, some of the
assets can be interest earning and performing - others, non-performing.
The maturity distribution of the assets is also of prime importance. If
most of the bank's assets can be withdrawn by its clients on a very
short notice (on demand) - it can swiftly find itself in trouble with a
run on its assets leading to insolvency.
Another oft-used figure
is the net income of the bank. It is important to distinguish interest
income from non-interest income. In an open, sophisticated credit
market, the income from interest differentials should be minimal and
reflect the risk plus a reasonable component of income to the bank. But
in many countries (Japan, Russia) the government subsidizes banks by
lending to them money cheaply (through the Central Bank or through
bonds). The banks then proceed to lend the cheap funds at exorbitant
rates to their customers, thus reaping enormous interest income. In many
countries the income from government securities is tax free, which
represents another form of subsidy. A high income from interest is a
sign of weakness, not of health, here today, there tomorrow. The
preferred indicator should be income from operations (fees, commissions
and other charges).
There are a few key ratios to observe. A
relevant question is whether the bank is accredited with international
banking agencies. The latter issue regulatory capital requirements and
other defined ratios. Compliance with these demands is a minimum in the
absence of which, the bank should be regarded as positively dangerous.
The
return on the bank's equity (ROE) is the net income divided by its
average equity. The return on the bank's assets (ROA) is its net income
divided by its average assets. The (tier 1 or total) capital divided by
the bank's risk weighted assets - a measure of the bank's capital
adequacy. Most banks follow the provisions of the Basel Accord as set by
the Basel Committee of Bank Supervision (also known as the G10). This
could be misleading because the Accord is ill equipped to deal with
risks associated with emerging markets, where default rates of 33% and
more are the norm. Finally, there is the common stock to total assets
ratio. But ratios are not cure-alls. Inasmuch as the quantities that
comprise them can be toyed with - they can be subject to manipulation
and distortion. It is true that it is better to have high ratios than
low ones. High ratios are indicative of a bank's underlying strength of
reserves and provisions and, thereby, of its ability to expand its
business. A strong bank can also participate in various programs,
offerings and auctions of the Central Bank or of the Ministry of
Finance. The more of the bank's earnings are retained in the bank and
not distributed as profits to its shareholders - the better these ratios
and the bank's resilience to credit risks. Still, these ratios should
be taken with more than a grain of salt. Not even the bank's profit
margin (the ratio of net income to total income) or its asset
utilization coefficient (the ratio of income to average assets) should
be relied upon. They could be the result of hidden subsidies by the
government and management misjudgement or understatement of credit
risks.
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